Licensing Multiple Sources of Information: Korean Evidentiality as a Three Term System

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Kwon, Iksoo. 2011. Licensing multiple sources of information. Korean evidentiality as a three term system. *Language and Linguistics* 55, 1-37. The aim of this paper is to put a full spotlight on Korean evidentiality markers and to explore their functions and distributions. This paper claims that contemporary Korean has a three term evidential system, consisting of the retrospective firsthand evidential -te-, the inferential evidential -napo-, and the reportive/quotative evidential -ay. This paper also reports that Korean is capable of marking multiple modes of access to linguistic content, which is typologically unique. Then, this paper discusses the speaker’s cognitive effort that is found in common in the construal of the three markers to manipulate conceptual distance between him/her and the focal event. It also discusses plausibility of the proposed system that they constitute. The discussion includes comparison of the system with other proposals in the literature. (XXXXXXX) (127 words)

Keywords: evidentiality, evidential system, contemporary Korean, multiple modes of access, a three term system.

1. Introduction

Evidentiality in Korean seems to have received little attention, because it is often analyzed as being subsumed under the category of modality (H.-S. Lee 1991; Strauss 2005: 441). The aim of this paper is to put a full spotlight on Korean evidentiality

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1) This paper is modified from its original draft, which has been presented at Harvard ISOKL (International Symposium of Korean Linguistics) in 2011. I would like to thank Ik-Hwan Lee and the audience for their invaluable comments. Any error, of course, will be mine.
markers and to explore their functions and distributions. Given that evidence facilitates the origo’s 2 assessment of the focal event, we might understand why Korean evidential constructions 3 have been included under the umbrella of the modality category. In this paper, however, I claim that the contemporary Korean has developed a system of evidentiality. Furthermore, This paper reports that multiple evidential markers in Korean are licensed in a single syntactic clause, which is typologically unique.

The system of evidentiality includes three markers, the retrospective firsthand evidential -te-, the inferential evidential -napo-, and the reportive/quotative -ay, which is shown in (2)-(4):

(1) pi-ka  o-n-ia
  rain-Nom  come-Non,past.Impf-Decl
  ‘It rains.’

(2) pi-ka  o-te-la
  rain-Nom  come-Ev.Fh-Decl
  ‘[I remember that] it was raining.’

(3) pi-ka  o-napo-la
  rain-Nom  come-Ev.Infr-Decl
  ‘[I guess] it rains.’

(4) pi-ka  o-n-t-ay
  rain-Nom  come-Non,past.Impf-Decl-Ev.Rep/Quot
  ‘[I was told that] it rains.’

Unlike the present depictive statement in (1), the statements with -te-, -napo-, and -ay indicate that their sources of information are firsthand experience, indirect inference, and hearsay, respectively. It should be noted, however, that these three linguistic items do not belong to the same paradigm; -te- and -napo- are in non-terminal suffix positions, whereas -ay occupies a terminal suffix position. In this respect, contemporary Korean has a ‘scattered’ evidentiality system (Aikhenvald 2004:80).

2) The definition of ‘origo’ is as follows: “[t]he one who perceives the evidence identified by the evidential particle” (Brugman and Macaulay 2010).

3) For the sake of clarification, the evidential construction by which this paper means refers to an utterance that contains any of the evidential markers.
This paper also addresses a typologically unique characteristic of Korean evidentiality, namely, that multiple modes of access are licensed in a single syntactic clause. Most languages do not allow the simultaneous use of multiple evidentials (Aikhenvald 2004:93); for example, in most languages, the constraints imposed by firsthand-evidential semantics simply conflict with those imposed by the hearsay mode of access. Korean, however, allows multiple evidentials in a single clause as in the sentence in (5):

(5) Inho-ka manhi
        Inho-Nom much
        apha-ess-t-ay-napo-te-la
        be.sick-Ant-Decl-Ev.Rep/Quo-Ev.Inf-Inf-Ev.-Decl

‘Inho seems to have been very sick.’ (= I remember that I made an inference from what someone said that that person seemed to have been told by another person who knew about it that Inho had been sick and based on the reasoning, I am telling you that Inho was very sick.)

The multiple evidentials in (5) are licensed because the events that each of the markers is associated with are different; -ay encodes that the conveyed information came from someone else (A), not from the speaker, -napo- encodes that the linkage between A and the ultimate source (B) was inferred by the speaker, and -te- encodes that the speaker herself inferred that A had been told about the information by B. This paper provides explanations of the compositionality of the Korean evidentiality constructions.

The organization of this paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I provide background knowledge of evidentiality in general including types of sources of information that are frequently accounted for across languages. Section 3 explores functions and distributions of each of the three Korean evidentiality markers in detail. Section 4 shows that more than one information source is licensed in a single syntactic clause and explores the typologically unique compositionality of multiple information sources with attested examples. Section 5 addresses cognitive motivation of the evidential constructions – conceptual distancing. It also discusses status of the Korean evidentiality system in a typological context and compares the proposed system to others in the previous literature. Section 6 concludes the overall discussion.

2. Backgrounds: Evidentiality
According to Aikhenvald (2003:1), evidential markers can be defined as “[l]inguistic devices that mark and specify type of the evidence on which a statement is based—whether the speaker saw it, or heard it, or inferred it from indirect evidence, or learnt it from someone else.” In short, evidentiality is the grammatical category whose primary function is specifying an information source (Aikhenvald 2004:1). This grammatical category is relatively pervasive: it has been reported to appear in about a quarter of the world’s languages (Aikhenvald 2004:1). By Aikhenvald and Dixon’s definition, the function of marking the source of information is the semantic core of evidentiality.

According to Aikhenvald (2004), there are six major types of information source accounted for across languages. The first and foremost type is vision. Since one’s perception by default relies on his/her vision, it is natural that a visual source of information be regarded as one of the significant types. Other ‘secondary’ senses other than vision such as olfactory, tactile, taste, and auditory are grouped into a non-visual sensory.

Inference and assumption function as other types of the source. Note that they differ from the other sources in that they rely on the origo’s knowledge, not on the origo’s perception, strictly speaking. In this respect, their identity is often contested between evidentiality and epistemic modality (William F. Hank, p.c. August 2011).

Hearsay is another significant type of source of reportive evidentiality. It indicates that the mode of access by which the speaker obtains information is not direct or firsthand, but an indirect report or hearsay without specifying the exact source/origin (Aikhenvald 2004: 177). In contrast, quotative signals that the mode of access by which the speaker obtains information is quotation, which introduces the exact author of the quoted report (Aikhenvald 2004: 177), i.e. an explicit information source in constructions.

These six types of sources are analytic cues for typological categorization of languages with regard to what kind of information source languages can encode, and how many terms they have as their grammatical system of evidentiality. According to Aikhenvald (2004), language groups differ with regard to the number of terms for marking modes of access in each language, varying from systems with two choices to those with five or more choices; examples are given in Table 1.

<table>
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<tr>
<td>A1. Firsthand and Non-firsthand:</td>
<td>B1. Direct (or Visual), Inferred,</td>
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Cherokee, Yukaghir, etc.  
A2. Non-firsthand versus ‘everything else’: Abkhaz, Turkish, etc.  
A3. Reported (‘hearsay’) versus ‘everything else’: Lezgian, Kham, Estonian, etc.  
A4. Sensory evidence and Reported (or ‘hearsay’): Ngiyambaa, Diyari, Latundé, etc.  
A5. Auditory (acquired through hearing) versus ‘everything else’: Euchee, etc.

Table 1. Aikhenvald’s 2004, Chapter 2) Evidentiality Systems over Languages

| C2. Direct (or Visual), Inferred, Assumed, Reported: Tsatiki, Shipibo-Konibo, etc. |  |
| C3. Direct, Inferred, Reported, Quotative: Cora, Northern Embera, etc. |  |

Table 1 classifies languages into four major groups depending on how many different types of information source can be encoded by their grammatical systems. Each of the major groups is divided into sub-groups according to which particular kinds of sources the languages can encode. For instance, languages with A2-type systems, including Abkhaz and Turkish, have a two-way grammatical distinction, between non-firsthand-evidentiality and everything else. Aikhenvald groups systems with five or more terms together as a major group; however, she notes that there are very few languages with more than five terms, if any (2004:60).

My claim in this study is that contemporary Korean is a B1-type system, as it has markers for firsthand (-te-), inferred (-napo-), and reportive/quotative (-ay)
3. Korean Evidentiality as a Three-Term System

This paper claims that present-day Korean has come to have a set of markers that indicate the source of the information being conveyed that together form a three-term system of evidentiality. This section explores in detail the distributions and functional properties of the three evidential elements, which each have specialized functions: -te- marks firsthand experience, -napo- marks inference and -ay- marks hearsay (with or without an explicit source).

3.1. The Firsthand Evidentiality Marker -Te-

The first marker on the list is the firsthand evidentiality marker -te- (J.-M. Song 1998, 2002, 2007; K.-A. Song 2009; J. Lee 2008, cf. K.-S. Chung 2006, 2007). When -te- is used by itself in a clause, it indicates that the focal event was unbounded, that the speaker perceived it directly, and that the speaker is accessing her subjective memory to convey information about it to the addressee.

3.1.1. Marking firsthand Evidentiality

The primary function of -te- is to signal that the information referenced by the -te- construction is the origo’s firsthand experience. The source or sources of information referenced by the -te- construction can include various kinds of direct experience. -Te- may be used with evidence coming from any of the first-hand senses, including vision, taste, tactile sensing, hearing, and smell. This flexibility is demonstrated in the

4) It is true that there are more than a few evidential expressions in Korean such as -kes kath- 'it seems like...,' -keschelem poi- 'it appears that...,' -na/nunka sip- 'feels like,' and -nummoyangi- 'it appears that...'. It does not mean, however, that all of them make evidential markers unless they undergo further grammaticalization processes so that they are reanalyzed as a single functional unit. So to speak, they are used in evidential "strategies," not as evidential markers. The author’s observation and claim is thus that the only elements that qualify as evidential markers are the three markers in contemporary Korean. One of the reviewers pointed out that to properly measure degree of the grammaticalization processes requires some more research on their frequencies. I fully agree with the reviewer and it calls for further corpus research in the future.
examples in (6)-(8).

(6) kwak-i  cca-te-la
    soup-Nom  be.salty-Ex.Fh-Decl
    '(I remember that) The soup was salty.'

(7) aki-uy  pol-i  pawtulep-te-la
    baby-Gen  cheek-Nom  be.soft-Ex.Fh-Decl
    '(I remember that) The baby's cheek was soft.'

(8) pakki-i  nemwu  sikkulep-te-la
    outside-Nom  too  be.noisy-Ex.Fh-Decl
    '(I remember that) It was too noisy out there.'

In (6), the speaker is remembering that she tasted some salty food; in (7), the speaker is remembering that the baby's cheek felt soft to her; and in (8), the speaker is remembering that she heard too much noise outside. Because the target events in all of these cases were perceived by the speakers firsthand, the -te- construction is licensed.

3.1.2. Conceptual distance marking

-Te- evokes an epistemic discontinuity (Kwon 2009); when it is used in an utterance, there must be a spatial and temporal discontinuity between the past event described and the temporal and spatial location in which the utterance occurs. This constraint seems natural when we consider that it encodes the semantic primes firsthand evidentiality, past tense, and retrospectivity; cognitive discontinuity is construed where prototypically firsthand and non-prototypically firsthand experiences meet. Unlike other tense markers/nonevidential tense markers, -te- makes reference not only to time but also to space, i.e. to the speaker's perceptual field (K.-S. Chung 2006, 2007), and thereby imposes evidential entailments. For example, a sentence such as that in (9) would never be acceptable, while (10) is grammatical.

(9) [Seeing that it is raining outside through the window,]
    *cikum  pi-ka  munhi  o-te-la
    now  rain-Nom  heavily  come-Ex.Fh-Decl
    'It's raining much now.'

(10) [Remembering that it rained outside yesterday,]
The only difference between these two utterances is whether they contain the time adverbial cikum ‘now’ or the time adverbial ecey ‘yesterday’; this implies that the semantics of the marker -te- requires a separation between the time frame in which the event of raining occurs and is experienced and the time frame in which the speaker describes that event. If, as in (9), those time frames are not separate, the utterance is unacceptable.

-te- can also indicate the speaker’s attitude, such as “psychological distance,” “weakened reliability” (Shin 1980), or “lack of responsibility” (Kim 1981). It is sometimes used to indicate that the occurrence of the event or situation that the speaker observed is not her responsibility, that she is just reporting it to the addressee. This might seem at first glance to be incompatible with the marker’s firsthand evidential function, as firsthand evidentiality involves a speaker’s direct experiential “vouching,” and a firsthand evidential marker therefore generally conveys that the proposition in question is more reliable and trustworthy (K.-S. Chung 2006) and that the speaker feels certain about it (Willett 1988); in other words, it conveys a high degree of epistemic certainty, which we can learn from the fact that a weak epistemic modal adverbial amanada ‘probably’ is never compatible with -te-.

If we consider that -te- also conveys past tense, however, it is not be impossible to explain the distanced attitude of the speaker. For example, the sentence in (11) could be licensed in a situation in which the speaker knew the addressee had hung her laundry outside.

\begin{verbatim}
(11) pi-la  o-te-la
outside-Loc rain-Nom come-Ex.Fh.Decl
’(I perceived that) it was raining outside.’
\end{verbatim}

In (11), the speaker is simply reporting what she has perceived with her senses, and is implying that she is not responsible for any consequences of the event. The utterance could be used when the speaker wanted to indicate that she had perceived that it was raining when she was entering the building and that she vouched for what she had perceived, but that she was not sure whether it was still raining outside or not, nor whether this would have any consequences with regard to the addressee’s laundry staying wet. The temporal gap between the focal event that the speaker
perceived and the speech-act event at the coding time enables the utterance to encode conceptual distance or deictic distance, and therefore makes room for subjectivity-related semantics such as lack of responsibility for the occurrence of the focal event to arise. To summarize, -te- can indicate the speaker’s distanced stance towards the focal event in addition to firsthand evidentiality. This is possible because the marker conveys a complex semantics composed of firsthand evidentiality, strongly positive epistemic modality, and past-tense reference.

3.2. Inferential Evidential Marker -Napo-

3.2.1. Inferential Evidential Marking

The marker -napo- is licensed when the experiencing origo has perceptually accessed some evidence available in the context then made an inference based on that perceived sensory evidence. The experience that is evoked by -napo- is an inference process, which is distinguished from that by -te-: information has been inferred using inductive logic applied to circumstantial sensory evidence (Aikhenvald 2004:36). The speaker’s inference makes an indirect experience that -napo- relies on. The function of -napo- as an evidential expression has been mentioned briefly by a few linguists (e.g., Strauss 2005:446, K.-A. Song 2009), but the precise conceptual structures associated with its use have not been thoroughly studied; the present study aims to fill that gap. I would like to argue that in contemporary Korean, -napo- indicates that the focal information the speaker is conveying is based on a process of inference.

The original form of the marker is not monomorphemic; -napo- is composed of a complementizer -na ‘whether’ and po- ‘see.’ The compositional construction -na po- corresponding to the grammaticalized marker -napo- is still used in contemporary Korean. In the examples in (12), the -na po- construction is used to profile the act of visually determining whether a focal event is happening (Kwon submitted).

(12)a. Chelswu-ka o-na po-n-ta
   Chelswu-Nom come-whether see-Imperf-Decl
   ‘I’m looking to see whether Chelswu is coming.’

b. Chelswu-ka o-na po-ala
   Chelswu-Nom come-whether see-Imp
   ‘Look and see whether Chelswu is coming.’
c. Chelswu-ka o-na po-ca
Chelswu-Nom come-whether see-Hort
‘Let’s look and see whether Chelswu is coming.’

The semantics underlying the -na po- construction as it is used in (12) involve the speaker seeking confirmation as to the truth of some conjectured piece of information, either by pursuing a course of action herself, as in (12a), by causing the addressee to pursue a course of action, as in (12b), or by getting the addressee to perform a course of action with her, as in (12c). The common denominator underlying the examples in (12) is that the truth of the information is not yet confirmed at the time of the speech act. The speaker uses the construction to draw the addressee’s attention to the conjectured focal event and, potentially, to induce the addressee to confirm whether it is occurring.

I now turn to considering how the grammaticalized form -napo- functions as an inferential evidential marker by examining some example utterances in which it appears. -Napo- indicates that the speaker has inferred that the described event is occurring (or has occurred or will occur, depending on the relationship between the event time and the speech-act time encoded by other elements in the verbal complex) based on her observation of the consequences that she thinks can be attributed the event. In other words, -napo- evokes the experiencing origo’s inductive reasoning process about cause-effect relationships (Kwon submitted); it is generally licensed in contexts in which a speaker infers a cause from her observation of its effects. For example, the sentence in (13) might be licensed in a situation where the speaker saw someone preparing to go out to eat or noted that someone was absent at dinner-time.

(13)a. (ku-ka) pap-mek-ule ka-\textit{napo}-a
   he-Nom rice-eat-in.order.to go-Ev.Infr-Indic
   ‘I guess, he is going to eat.’

b. (ka-ku) pap-mek-ule ka-\textit{ike}-n-\textit{kapo}^5-a
   he-Nom rice-eat-in.order.to go-Fut-Imperf-Ev.Infr-Indic
   ‘I guess, he will go eat.’

c. (ka-ku) pap-mek-ule ka-\textit{ess}-\textit{napo}-a

5) -\textit{kapo} is an allomorph of -\textit{napo}; its form is determined by the form of its preceding element (usually, -\textit{kapo} is used after the imperfective marker -\textit{nun}).
If, for example, the sentence in (13c) had not had -napo- in it, it would have been taken as neutral with regard to the source of the evidence, and might have been licensed in contexts in which the speaker had seen the subject entering a restaurant (firsthand evidence) or in which the speaker had been told that the subject had gone out for a meal (hearsay evidence). However, when the marker -napo- is used, the source of the focal information must be inference. This shows that -napo- is an inferential evidential marker.

However, the source of information about the consequence of the inferred cause does not have to be visual, despite the fact that -napo- is derived from the vision-related lexical item po- ‘see.’ For example, in the sentence in (14), the speakers are using information obtained via other senses as evidence; the sentence in (14) could be used in a situation where the speaker had just tasted something very salty.

(14) yolda-ka sokum-ul manhi neh-ess-napo-a
      cook-Nom salt-Acc much put-in-Ant-Exfr-Indic
   ‘It seems the cook put too much salt in this.’

Because the speaker has experienced the saltiness of the food, she is able to reconstruct by inductive reasoning the event of the cook’s having put too much salt in it.

Note that, in (13c)-(14), the speaker is not absolutely sure of her conclusion; she is seeking confirmation from the addressee about what she is inferring. The weakness of the speaker’s belief can be proven by testing its compatibility with a strong epistemic modal adverb such as pwunmyenghi ‘for sure.’ If any of the utterances in (13c)-(14) had included pwunmyenghi, they would have been only marginally acceptable. (It would be equivalent to saying in English I guess the cook definitely didn’t put too much salt in the soup). In this respect, the confirmation-seeking pragmatic tactic used in the examples in (12) with nongrammaticalized -na po- seem to be critical to understanding the semantics of the grammaticalized -napo-.

To sum up, the marker -napo- has the following basic properties. First, the information about the event that is being talked about in an utterance that contains -napo- must have been acquired by the speaker through inference. Second, the utterance must specifically be based on the speaker’s inductive reasoning process; i.e.,
it must depict a situation where the speaker is inferring a cause (often a
generalization) from its effect (often an individual case). Given these properties, I
argue that -napo- should be described as an inferential evidential marker.

3.2.2. Conceptual distance marking: Mirativity and Politeness

3.2.2.1. Mirativity

-Napo- is sometimes licensed in contexts where a speaker intends to convey
the unexpectedness of a focal event, rather than to actually convey inferential
semantics. Following Delancey’s (2001) terminology, this paper will use mirative for the
functional category encoded by the marker. Mirativity is described in Aikhenvald
(2004: 197) as follows: “… the use of a non-firsthand evidential implies the lack
of control and, more generally, the ‘unprepared mind’ of the speaker.” At the
speech-act time, if an event has occurred and if the speaker is surprised by the focal
event, her utterance encoding the unexpectedness constitutes an example of mirativity.
A sentence such as that in (15) might be licensed in a situation in which the speaker
had thought the weather was clear, but then looked out the window and seen that it
was raining (Kwon 2010).

(15) pakh-ey pse-ka o-napo-a
outside-Loc rain-Nom come-Ex.Infr-Decl
‘Huh. I guess it’s raining out.’

The example in (15) is clearly not an example of an inferential use of the marker
in the canonical sense, because the speaker has direct visual access to the event; the
knowledge that it is raining is not a result of the speaker’s inference, but a consequence of her observation of the rain through the window. -Napo- is,
nevertheless, licensed in this context, in other words, -napo- functions as a mirative
marker.

The mirative function of -napo- can be seen clearly by comparing the sentences
in (16) and (17), which differ in what they imply about the specificity of the entity
referred to in the subject (Kwon 2010).

(16) cip-ey koyangi-ka iss-e
house-Loc cat-Nom be-Indic
‘There’s a cat in the house.’
In (16), which does not contain -napo-, the cat referred to might be the pet cat or might be an unfamiliar cat. However, in (17), the only available reading is that the cat is unfamiliar.

(17) cip-ey kayangi-ka iss-napo-a
house-loc cat-nom be-ev-inf-indic
‘Hey, there’s a cat in the house!’

The sentence in (17) might, for example, be licensed in a situation in which the speaker had not known there was a cat in the house until it brushed against her leg. In fact, (17) would not be licensed if the speaker had already known there was a cat in the house before it brushed against her, supporting the idea that -napo- is being used in a mirative function.

In sum, the examples in this subsection demonstrate that the marker -napo- can encode mirativity as well as simple inferential evidential semantics (Kwon 2010, submitted).

3.2.2.2. Politeness

So far, I have demonstrated -napo- can be used as an inferential evidential marker, licensed where the speaker has no direct sensory access to the focal event in question, and as a mirative marker. This subsection focuses on another use of the marker, in politeness strategies.

-Napo-’s property of creating conceptual distance between the experiential origo and the focal event allows it to be used as a politeness strategy, especially when the speaker is attempting to avoid a face-threatening act. In other words, -napo- can be used to mitigate the strength of the speaker’s assertion. For example, the sentence in (18) might be used by a bartender to politely tell a drunken customer who was demanding more drinks that he should instead stop drinking and go home (Kwon 2010, submitted).

(18) cip-ey ka-si-e-yo.
home-loc go-hon-comm-comm-hon.end
manhi chwiha-si-ess-(napo)-e-yo.
much be.drunk-hon-ant-ev-inf-decl-hon.end
‘You should probably head home, sir. I think you may have drunk too much.’

The utterance in (18) would have been considered rude without -napo-. However,
the marker allows the speaker to engage in the pragmatic tactic of hedging: in this case, although the bartender has observed the customer’s obvious drunkenness, he pretends not to have seen it directly, but to have inferred it indirectly from some other evidence. Again, this use of -napo- is not prototypical inferential marking; the speaker has observed the situation with his own senses and is therefore certain about it.

Rather, in situations like that in (18), the inferential-marking function of -napo- is being pragmatically extended. The pragmatic tactic involved is based partly on the marker’s inferential function and partly on its mirative function. In (18), the speaker cannot assert directly that his customer is drunk, as this would threaten the customer’s face, so he instead uses the inferential marker to distance himself from the focal event, i.e., to pretend not to have perceived it directly and not to be certain of it. In addition, the mirativity function of -napo- allows the speaker to frame the situation as if he has only just recognized that his customer is drunk (or might be drunk). The shorter the period of time in which it has been obvious that the customer is drunk, the less face threat is involved in saying something to him about it.

I would like to argue that a common cognitive mechanism underlies all of the functions of -napo- described above, encoding inferential evidentiality, encoding mirative semantics, and facilitating politeness strategies: cognitive distancing. When a speaker indicates that she has not obtained the stated information via direct perceptual access, this implies a cognitive gap between the evidence and what is inferred from it. This cognitive distancing naturally paves the way for contexts where the marker encodes mirative semantics, because unexpectedness presupposes a cognitive discontinuity between the speaker’s previous state of knowledge and the focal information. Cognitive distance also provides a natural explanation for the fact that -napo- can be used as a politeness strategy, because it neutralizes speaker assertions that might otherwise threaten an addressee’s face (Kwon submitted).

3. The Reportive/Quotative Evidential -Ay

The third evidentiality marker is -ay, which indicates the speaker has obtained the focal information via an indirect mode of access such as hearsay. (Kwon 2011, J-Y. Chung In preparation).

3.3.1. The Constructional properties of -ay
To this section provides some background on the -ay constructions. The sentences in (19) exemplify some of the relevant utterance types (from Kwon 2011).

(19) a. nayil pi-ka o-n-ta
tomorrow rain-Nom come-Imprf-Decl
‘It will rain tomorrow.’

b. nayil pi-ka o-n-ta-(ko)-ha-n-ta
tomorrow rain-Nom come-Imprf-Decl-Comp-say-Imprf-Decl
‘I’m told it will rain tomorrow.’

c. nayil pi-ka o-n-t-ay-ta
tomorrow rain-Nom come-Imprf-Decl-Ev.Rep-Imprf-Decl
‘It will rain tomorrow.’

The reportive evidentiality marker -ay originally comes from the periphrastic expression ta-(ko)-ha Decl + complementizer + ‘say.’ A more literal translation of (19b) would be something like ‘It’s said that it’s raining tomorrow.’ The periphrastic expression has undergone phonological attrition (tako-ha-e [tagɔhæ] > ta-ha-e [tahæ] > tay [tae]). (For an in-depth discussion of the combinations of -ay within the basic sentence types, see Kwon 2011, J.-Y. Chung, in preparation).

3.3.2. The Functional Properties of -ay

3.3.2.1. The Reportive Use of -ay

Considering that the original form of -ay is -ko-ha complementizer + ‘say,’ it is likely that when it is used as a reportive evidentiality marker, the source of information involved is hearsay, where the source is neither the speaker nor the addressee. The indirectness of the mode of access can be seen in most tokens of utterances containing -ay in KORTERM (http://morph.kaist.ac.kr/ kcp). -Ay constructions can be used in multiple contexts. The sentence in (20) exemplifies the reportive function of the marker.

(20) ppulkan masukuha-ka tto yeca-lul
cwuk-i-ess-t-ay
red mask-Nom again woman-Acc
cwuk-i-ess-t-ay
kill-Gaus-Ant-Decl-Ev.Rep
‘(It is said that) The ‘Red Mask’ has killed another woman.’
In (20), the information about the focal event, the Red Mask’s killing someone, has been obtained from an unknown source. The speaker is simply conveying the obtained information, without claiming any responsibility for its truth, to the addressee. Since neither of these examples specifies the source of information, they are both examples of reportive evidential constructions.

3.3.2.2. The Quotative Use of -ay

-ay can also be employed in quotative constructions. Quotative constructions are different from reportives in that they have a source of information that is explicitly spoken on the surface. The speaker’s reference to an explicit source allows her to imply that the information has some validity. An example is given in (21).

(21) wuli wancho-ka kaoynhanh-umyen
    our boss-Nom be.okay-if
    sa-heyss-t-ay
    buy-Presump.modal-Decl-Ev.Qot
    ‘According to our boss, our boss will buy it if it’s okay.’

In (21), the source of the information is explicitly manifested as a grammatical subject, i.e., the speaker’s boss.

3.3.4. Marking Further Conceptual Distance: Thirdhand Evidential Marking

The reportive/quotative evidentiality marker -ay is distinct from other evidentiality markers in that it can be repeated to contribute a second layer of reportive or quotative semantics. When -ay is duplicated and when the two instances are bridged by a morpheme of temporal grounding (such as the imperfective marker -nun- or the anteriority marker -ess-), the utterance conveys the focal information is thirdhand. This recursivity is not surprising, given that the marker has been grammaticalized from a form that contains a complementizer. This thirdhand evidentiality use is exemplified in (22).

(22) Chelswu-ka Yenghay-lul
    Chelswu-Nom Yenghay-Acc
    cohahu-n-t-ay-exo-t-ay
    like-Imprf-Ev.Rep/Quot-Ant-Decl-Ev.Rep
a. ‘I heard it’s said Chelswu likes Yenghay.’
b. ‘I heard that, according to Chelswu, Chelswu likes Yenghuy.’

The sentence in (22) is ambiguous because -ay itself is ambiguous between the reportive and quotative readings. If both uses of -ay in (22) are construed as reportives, (22a) is understood as having no specific information source at any degree of remove. In this case, there are six potential participants, Chelswu, Yenghuy, the speaker, the addressee, and two other unknown persons, X and Y. The situation could be construed as follows: Y obtained from X the information that Chelswu likes Yenghuy (it is not specified how X obtained this information). Y told the speaker that Y had heard that Chelswu likes Yenghuy. Then, the speaker is conveying the information that has been handed down from X via Y to the addressee.

In the other possible reading of (22), the first instance of -ay is construed as quotative and the second as reportive, yielding the meaning in (22b). In this case, there are five potential participants, Chelswu, Yenghuy, the speaker, the addressee, and some unknown person X. In this reading, it is understood that Chelswu himself told X that he likes Yenghuy and that X let the speaker know this information. The speaker is then conveying information that has been handed down from Chelswu via X to the addressee.

Notice that it cannot be the case that (22) can be construed as a double quotative construction, because there is only one overt subject that can serve as an explicit information source. It also cannot be the case that only the second instance of -ay is quotative, since the explicit subject cannot act as the recounting origo for hearsay of which he is the object.

To summarize the preceding subsections, in Korean, reportive evidentiality and quotative evidentiality are covered by a single marker -ay, although they are usually covered by separate markers in other languages (Aikhenvald 2004). The marker is a grammaticalized form derived from the periphrastic construction -ko-ha-complementizer + 'say.' This complementizing function is inherited from the original construction, allowing -ay to be used recursively to convey thirdhand information to the addressee.

4. Multiple Evidentiality Markers Licensed in a Single Syntactic Clause

In this subsection, I will focus on a typologically unique property of Korean, namely that, in Korean, more than two evidentials can be licensed in a single clause,
a rare situation according to Aikhenvald (2004:93). Aikhenvald has argued that only one such example has been found, namely Tsafiki, where the reported evidential can be repeated to indicate up to three sources “between the speaker and the original event” (Dickinson 2000:408, cited in Aikhenvald 2004:93). The following example, with three evidential markers in a single clause, shows that Korean is another example of this kind.

(23) pyengo-ka hoycang-nim-hako tamphan-ul
Pyengo-Nom CEO-Hon-with talk.table-Acc
ci-ess-t-ay-napo-te-la
decide-Ant-Decl-Ev.Rep-Ex.Inf-Ex.Fl-Decl
‘I guess I heard it’s said that Pyengo settled the issues with the CEO’
(http://moodeungilbo.co.kr/searchview.php3?no=60158&read_temp=20020416&section=12)

The sentence in (23) might be licensed in a situation in which the speaker clearly remembered that her friend had said something that caused the speaker to infer that the friend had heard from someone else that Pyengo and the CEO had settled the issues in question. In this example, the three evidential expressions are employed at the same time; to my understanding, is the maximum number of markers that can appear between the two declarative markers -t- and -la in the KVC. The functions of the markers converge into a complex meaning that indicates that the conveyed information comes from someone else, neither the speaker nor the speaker’s source (-ay), that the linkage between the original source and the person who passed the information on to the speaker has been inferred by the speaker (-napo-), and that the speaker remembers for sure what she heard and what that caused her to infer (-te-). This compositionality of the markers’ functions is not surprising, given that when two evidentials are used, they generally either confirm or complement each other (Shipino-Konibo, Aikhenvald 2004:88). Utterances with two evidential markers are also easily found in Korean; some examples are given in (24)-(26).

(24) coki-congyeng pantay-ka iss-umyen kyeysok
early-shut.down objection-Nom be-if continuously
ha-n-t-ay-napo-e-yo
ds-Imprf-Decl-Ex.Rep-Ex.Inf-Indic-Hon
‘It seems that if there are objections to the early cancellation, they’ll keep doing it.’
(http://kin.naver.com/qna/detail.nhn?d1id=3&dirId=3010101&docId=54644134&qb=)
In each of the examples above, the evidential markers’ functions do not conflict with each other; rather, they are construed compositionally. In (24), the reportive and inferential evidentials are used to indicate the speaker has made an inference based on something she heard; in (25), the reportive and firsthand evidentials are used to indicate the speaker remembers the direct experience of hearing something; and in (26), the inferential and firsthand evidentials are used to indicate that the speaker remembers the direct experience of inferring something.

In brief, the possibility of functional concatenation shows that the Korean evidentiality system is a scattered one, rather than a stand-alone paradigm. This is based on the important observation that Korean is another rare case where more than two evidentials can be used.

5. Discussion

It has been said that evidentiality in Korean has not been studied in enough depth that it can be determined precisely where and how it may fit within the typology of evidentiality (Strauss 2005:444). This paper, however, argues that Korean has a three-term evidential system that spans different modes of access to the information source and explores the following markers: -te- (firsthand experience), -napo- (inference), and -ay (reportive, quotative, hearsay). Based on the above discussion of the functional properties of the evidentiality markers, this section further makes an
attempt to answer two outstanding questions: (a) why is conceptual distance related commonly to the construal of the three markers? (b) what is the status of the contemporary Korean evidentiality from a typological perspective?

5.1. Motivation of the Conceptual Distance

We have seen that conceptual distance is involved in the construal of all the three evidential markers; the speaker makes efforts to manipulate distance between him or her and the event in question, when uttering the evidential construction.

The cognitive manipulation of distancing naturally kicks in the construal for the following reason: The evidential constructions always evoke two events; an event that is perceived via a particular mode of access and another in which the speaker obtains evidence of the occurrence of the perceived event. Since the evidential construction is a result of superimposition of the two evoked events, there are two viewpoints interacting with each other: the experiencing origo in the perceived (focal) event and the perceiving self in the speech event. The speaker, taking the role of the perceiving self, is thus able to pose his or her subjective stance – epistemic, emotional, or whatever it may be – toward the event in question. And this is where the conceptual distance fits in. Without simulating the conceptual/deictic gap between two perspectives, we can never construe evidential constructions.

The conceptual distance evoked by evidential markers has already been reported by Aikhenvald (2003:12): “Semantically broad evidential categories involve creating a conceptual distance, which results in the overtones of ‘unprepared mind’ involving unexpected, new (and surprising) information, and also ‘noncommitment’ of the speaker to the truth of the utterance, and caution and modesty” (italics mine).

In this respect, the speaker’s distancing strategy is the underlying cognitive mechanism that motivates functions of the Korean evidential constructions.

5.2. The Typological Status of the Korean Evidentiality System

Although Korean does not have a stand-alone grammatical category of evidentials like that of some other languages, such as Quechua (Faller 2003, inter alia), it employs an evidential system that can be defined in terms of pragmatic, functional, and or cognitive phenomena related to the concept of information source. It can thus be seen why some linguists would claim that the way the Korean language construes evidential meanings is significant from a typological perspective: An evidential
meaning is not necessarily marked by independent morphemes, but can be expressed by interactions among other temporal categories (J. Lee 2008:18, 22).

It does not mean, however, that Korean does not have a system of evidentiality. My claim is that contemporary Korean employs a scattered system of evidentiality whose members, -te-, -napo-, and -ay, are bound to the concept of mode of access (evoking, respectively, firsthand, inferential, and reportive/quotative access). Note that the three evidential linguistic items are not found in the same grammatical position in the Korean verbal complex; -te- and -napo- are located in the non-terminal suffix position, whereas -ay is located in the terminal suffix position. Moreover, according to Aikhenvald (2004: 80), evidentiality specifications may be scattered in the verbal complex, not forming a single grammatical category. This study thus claims that Korean belongs to the language group that has scattered evidentiality. Particularly, among Aikhenvald’s (2004) categorization of language groups, Korean belongs to the language group that has an evidentiality system with three choices: Direct (or Visual), Inferred, and Reported (Quotative).

Note that the firsthand evidential marker is the only one that is historically monomorphemic, which might indicate that it was historically the first element to acquire a specifically evidential function. From a synchronic point of view, considering how contemporary speakers construe the linguistic constructions under discussion, I claim that the other markers have conspired to fill the gaps in the emerging evidentiality system via a grammaticalization process that this is why contemporary Korean has a scattered system of evidentiality.

5.3. Comparison with other systems in the previous literature

6) One of the reviewers pointed out that it is doubtful to generalize that the three markers belong to a single grammatical category in Korean grammar because their formations are morphologically different. In a similar vein, some scholars (Anderson 1986, De Haan 2001) claim that the existence of a category of evidentiality must be bound up with grammatical status. However, another group of scholars (Boye and Harder 2009:10) argue that the linguistic category is considered a pragmatic, functional, or cognitive phenomenon (Kwon 2012:128). This paper takes the latter position; most importantly, the markers’ functions are all to mark a mode of access to information in question. In addition, the three markers are grammaticalized so that their internal morphological structures are opaque when they are used as evidentials in present-day Korean. I thus believe that -te-, -napo-, and -ay absolutely belong to a single functional category of evidentiality in Korean.
Some Korean linguists (J.-M. Song 2007; K.-A. Song 2009; K.-S. Chung 2006) argue that there exists a system of evidentiality in Korean. The systems that they proposed are, however, different from the proposed system in this paper. J.-M. Song’s (2007) system includes the volitive/predictive/presumptive/epistemic modal marker -keyss- instead of -napo-, and the mirative/factive modal marker -ney without acknowledging its obvious mirative, factive, assertive function.

In a nutshell, -keyss- and -ney do not primarily function as an evidential marker; the functionally versatile marker -keyss- in Song’s system is more like an epistemic modal marker that encodes the speaker’s deductive reasoning and presumption within an epistemic domain; -ney is more like a modal suffix that belongs to the grammatical paradigm of epistemic modal suffixes (-kwun, -ci, etc. H.-S. Lee 1991).

The logic underlying here is that the fact that a certain element can encode evidential semantics does not necessarily guarantee that the element functions mainly as an evidential marker.

5.2.1 The Volitive/ Predictive/ Presumptive/ Epistemic Modal Marker -keyss-

-Keyss- has various meanings such as futurity, volition, prediction, presumption, and epistemic modality (M. Kim 2008), whereas -napo- only has the inferential evidential semantics. The modal semantics of -keyss-, not its evidential sense, conveyed by -keyss- is shown in the comparison with -napo- below:

(27) ku-ka kong-ul cha-keyss-tna
     he-Nom. ball-Acc kick-keyss-Decl
  a. ‘He shall kick a ball.’
  b. ‘(I expect/guess that) he will kick a ball.’

(27) has a passive meaning from its modal semantics (27a) as well as its inferential semantics (27b). Note that its inferential semantics (27b) does not necessarily require that there be evidence available in the immediate context: it is possible that the speaker is estimating the time of occurrence of the focal event with no reference to immediate evidence, but rather has already obtained the information that the subject is going to kick the ball at a certain time. In this case, the conveyed information is not a consequence of the speaker’s inference based on some evidence available in the context, but a consequence of the speaker’s inference from her prior knowledge.

I believe that, although -keyss- involves the speaker’s conjectural inference in its
construal based on prior knowledge, it cannot be considered a prototypical inferential-evidentiality marker. The inferred state of affairs coded by the conjectural usage of the marker is based on the speaker’s prior knowledge rather than on her immediate perception. I therefore argue that -keyss- should therefore be classified not as an evidential marker but as an epistemic-modal marker; it indicates that some premises have led the experiencing origo to draw a conclusion based on her “stored” knowledge and a process of assessment. In short, when a premise enables the speaker to conclude that a certain event will take place, whether or not she obtains additional evidence from the current context, -keyss- is licensed. In contrast, -napo- is licensed when the speaker accesses available evidence in the context and draws an inference from that observation.

(28)  
\[ \text{he-Nom ball-Acc kick-Ev.Infr-Decl} \]  
\'(Considering evidence available in context, I guess that) he will kick a ball.\'

-Napo- constitutes a prototypical inferential evidential marker, since the information source encoded by the marker is clearly the speaker’s inference, which arises from the speaker’s perception of evidence present in a given context. Crucially, -napo- does not have other functions such as marking volitional/ futurity/ presumptive modality; it only encodes the speaker’s inference as information source.

I thus claim that, within the Korean evidentiality system, -napo- is an inferential-evidential marker that evokes the use of explicit evidence in the context and an inductive inference process. In contrast, -keyss- is an presumptive epistemic-modal marker that evokes the use of the speaker’s prior knowledge and a deductive inference process.

5.2.2 The Mitrative/factual Realization Marker -Ney

It seems clear that -ney has the firsthand evidential semantics. It is not, however, the end of the story. In fact, it is an element whose identity is controversial between marking firsthand evidential semantics (K-S. Chung 2006, 2007) and marking mirative semantics (DeLancey 2001) or marking factual realization (H.-S. Lee 1991, 1993; C. Lee 2009). For example, the main function of -ney in the following example is to indicate that the conveyed information is factual based on the immediate realization of it, rather than simply to mark the speaker’s firsthand experience (H-S. Lee 1991: 403):
(29) *kan-i nappu-i*-ney-yo
   liver-Nom be.had-Hon-ney-Hon.
   ‘(It turned out that) you have a problem with your liver.’

(29) is a doctor’s diagnosis from a conversation between a doctor and a patient, looking at an x-ray picture of the patient’s chest. In (29), information conveyed with -ney is that what the speaker realizes at the coding time is a fact. So to speak, what the marker encodes is more like the speaker’s strong epistemic stance toward the focal event than the direct mode of access (Lee further compares -ney with -kwun which can replace -ney in (29) without a significant influence on the interpretation, and mentions that the more definite factuality reading is conveyed by -ney than by -kwun (Chang 1985)).

Another question arises here: if -ney is regarded as a firsthand evidential, what is the grammatical status of -kwun? -Kwun belongs to the same grammatical paradigm (sentence terminal suffix position) as -ney does and also functions similar to it. If someone argues that -ney should be included in the evidential system, they should clearly state where -kwun belongs to as well, which has been regarded as a mirative modal (Sohn 1994; C. Lee 2009).

In this vein, including -ney into the Korean evidential system without acknowledging its outstanding functional and morphological modal characteristic seems to need more explanations of its syntagmatic/paradigmatic relations with other modal markers (-ci, -kwun, -e, etc., H-S Lee 1991). Even though I agree that -ney partly conveys the firsthand evidential semantics, it does not necessarily mean that the marker’s major function is to mark the firsthand evidential semantics (For more discussion, see Kwon 2012).

6. Conclusion

In this study, I have shown that contemporary Korean has developed a system of evidentiality that consists of three evidentiality markers, specialized to encode three distinct modes of access to the focal information. Specifically, it includes -te- as a firsthand evidentiality marker, -napo- as an inferential evidentiality marker, and -ay as a reportive/quotative evidential marker. This study also discussed a typologically unique characteristic of the Korean Evidentiality system. That is, multiple sources of information are licensed within a clause in a compositional way.
Based on the observations, this paper raised two outstanding questions: how is conceptual distancing related in common to the construal of all the three evidential constructions?; what is the typological status of the Korean evidentiality system? For the first question, it is natural that the speaker manipulate the conceptual distance between a focal event that is perceived and an event in which the speaker perceives the focal event, when using the constructions. The speaker cognitively makes efforts to manipulate the conceptual distance/gap between the two events that are evoked by the constructions. For the second question, although it does not seem to have a prototypical stand-alone paradigmatic grammatical category of evidentiality, the Korean verbal complex has a 'scattered' system of evidentiality, which encodes the three types of information source. Lastly, I claimed that the proposed system is plausible over the other systems that had been proposed in the previous literature. I backed up my claim by discussing outstanding modal semantics of the volitive/predictive/presumptive/epistemic modal marker -keyss- and the factive realization/mirative modal marker -ney, both of which are main elements of the other systems that have been proposed in the literature.

References


