Mental Spaces in the Korean Reportive/Quotative Evidentiality Marker -Ay

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Kwon, Iksoo. 2011. Mental spaces in the Korean reportive/quotative evidentiality Marker -Ay. *Discourse and Cognition* 18:2, 57-85. This paper explores functional properties and distributions of Korean reportive and quotative evidentiality marker -ay. I argue that the attempt to explain -ay only in terms of a syntactic constraint fails, because the marker’s function is a matter of (inter)subjective semantics that arises from complex interactions among the multiple viewpoints that are involved. In this vein, within the framework of Mental Spaces Theory (Fauconnier 1994, 1997), this study shows that we can explain examples that are beyond syntactic constraints as well as canonical examples of the construction in a unified way. To provide cognitively motivated accounts, I argued that the Evidentiality construction requires another way of space building because of the presuppositional characteristic of information that the construction accommodates. I called it Presuppositional Space Accommodation and explored how it works for the Korean Evidentiality construction. (University of California, Berkeley)

*Key words:* Evidentiality, Reportive, Quotative, Mental Spaces, Presuppositional Space Accommodation

1. Introduction

Human beings are egocentric. In our language use, we view the world through the window of our own perspective by default. We experience numerous entities, events or relations that hold between them either directly or indirectly in the world. We physically see, hear, smell, touch, and taste
various stimuli with our sensory organs and encode the experiences into utterances. Based on the language user's accessibility toward an entity or an event in the real world, (s)he produces new information adding his or her belief or attitude towards the focal entity or event to what (s)he intends to say. As the information is disseminated, its status changes from information that has not been assimilated yet to the addressee's knowledge to the one that has been assimilated. This communicative routine becomes deeply entrenched into human's cognition so that it forms a communicative habitus where communicative participants effectively understand and simulate intentions and meanings.

In this respect, it would not be unnatural for a language to be equipped with linguistic devices marking the accessibility and modes of the access (information source; evidentiality; Aikhenvald 2004) colored by the speaker's attitude toward the information (assessment; epistemic modality). Indeed, languages in general have categories of functional devices that reflect such functionalities: the mode of access by which people experience things is encoded by Evidentiality (EV, henceforth); memory via which people access the things is invoked or encoded by past tense or retrospective mood; the unassimilated knowledge that spreads out to the addressee's knowledge plays a role of new information in information structure or into forms of unprepared of mind of the speaker (mirativity; DeLancey 2001) and so on. Among a variety of linguistic devices that are involved in the communicative frame, this paper aims to focus on EV, particularly reportive/quotative EV -a'y in Korean.

It is surprising that although Korean grammar has been extensively studied, there have been very few systematic accounts covering an overall picture of its evidential system (except Lee 1991; K.-S. Chung 2005, 2007). Presumably, that is because it is difficult to separate its Evidentiality system from its Tense, Aspect, and Modality systems due to their complex functional overlapping and interactions. As a result, it seems that Evidentiality has not received as much attention as Modality in Korean (Ko 2007; Strauss 2005). This lack of attention to the overall Evidentiality system has resulted in confusion over definitions of Modal and Evidential categories in Korean grammar. This paper explores reportive/quotative evidential marker -a'y in Korean as part of attempts to shed light on the overall evidential system in Korean. Here are some examples of interest:
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(1) \textit{nayil pi-ka o-n-ta} \hspace{1cm} \text{tomorrow rain-Nom come-Imperf-Ded}

'It rains tomorrow.'

(2) \textit{nayil pi-ka o-n-t-ay} \hspace{1cm} \text{tomorrow rain-Nom come-Imperf-Ded-ay}

Lit. (I was told that) Rain comes tomorrow.

'(I was told by someone that) It rains tomorrow.'

(1) is an indicative utterance that employs a declarative ending marker \textit{-ta} without any EV marker. When a reportive EV marker \textit{-ay} is used as shown in (2), however, it indicates that information of the event of raining is obtained via hearsay.

Reportive EV \textit{-ay} has been discussed in only a few works (Lee 1991; inter alia), recently in terms of syntactic constraints (J.-Y. Chung In preparation, 2009). For instance, J.-Y. Chung mentions that \[\text{the reportive EV requires that the source of information be a third-person source, whether the source is explicitly expressed or not (J.-Y. Chung In preparation: 13).}\] In other words, if a first person subject is used with reportive EV, the sentence is not licensed. Hence, (4a) is not acceptable, whereas (3) is fine:

(3) \textit{chelswu-ka ne-lul salangha-n-t-ay} \hspace{1cm} \text{Chelswu-Nom you-Acc love-Imperf-Ded-ay}

'(I was told by Chelswu that) Chelswu loves you.'

(4) \textit{nay-ka ne-lul salangha-n-t-ay} \hspace{1cm} \text{I-Nom you-Acc love-Imperf-Ded-ay}

Lit. (I was told by myself) I love you.

a. '?'(I heard that I was saying that) I love you.'

b. '(It is said that) I love you.'

The observation made in (3), (4a) and (4b) would have been valid if we had limited our discussion to the surface syntactic constraints on the reportive/quotative constructions. The syntactic constraint, however, does not work in the following example:
(5) [In the speaker’s dream, the speaker had a conversation with her ‘self’ in her dream. The speaker describes the situation to the addressee and the speaker reports the content to the addressee without making the source explicit]

\[ kkwum-soke-e\, nay-ka \, ne-lul \, salanha-n-t-ay \]

dream-inside-Loc \, I-Nom \, you-Acc \, love-Imperf-Decl-ay

Lit. In my dream, I was told (by myself) that I love you.
‘In my dream, I heard that I was saying that I love you.’

(5) is licensed, even though it is a quotative construction that employs a first person subject as information source, which the syntactic constraint is not able to capture.

For this reason, this paper argues that the reportive/quotative constructions are not a matter of surface syntactic constraint per se, but rather are a matter of understanding how viewpoint semantics of subjectivity works for the construction. Based on the observations that are made regarding the licensing conditions of the marker, this paper aims to introduce and thoroughly discuss the constructions as part of a long-term project targeting the overall Korean evidential system (Kwon to appear).

Major questions that this paper aims to ponder on are as follows:

- What are functional properties of the Korean reportive/quotative EV marker -ay?
- How does the semantics of the marker override the syntactic constraint on the subject usage?
- And, how do we explain it from a perspective of Cognitive Linguistics?

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 clarifies definitions of terminology: reportives and quotatives. In Section 3, this paper pursues an answer for the first question, which is to reckon constructional/semantic properties of the Korean reportive/quotative construction. In the ensuing section, this study addresses that the asymmetry in first/ non-first person subject usages in the construction cannot be fully explicated only in terms of formal syntactic constraints. Rather, we need a cognitively motivated framework to fully account for the viewpoint phenomena of subjectivity, particularly semantic interaction between the experiencing origo’s subjective
experience and the marker’s inherent constructional property requiring an indirect source. As an alternative, Section 4 argues that the Mental Spaces framework (Fauconnier 1994, 1997) provides a way to represent the viewpoint phenomena, modeling the outstanding counterexamples of the syntactic constraint as well as its canonical examples in a unified way. Section 5 concludes the discussion.

2. Background: Reportives and Quotatives

Before analyzing phenomena in question fully, I would like to clarify definitions of reportive and quotative evidentials. The distinction between the two constructions is crucial when we attempt to identify the marker’s functional properties, even though -ay covers both the functions in Korean. Furthermore, the distinction is absent in Chung’s discussion of syntactic constraint: “[t]he reportive EV requires that the source of information be a third-person source, whether the source is explicitly expressed or not” (J.-Y. Chung In preparation: 13).

Reportive EV by which I mean in this paper is that the mode of access by which the speaker obtains information is not direct or firsthand, but an indirect report or hearsay without specifying the exact authorship (Aikhenvald 2004:177): for instance, when the speaker was told by anonymous people or unidentified hearsay about some information and when the speaker talks about the information to others, (s)he encodes that the target information is from what (s)he heard by employing this kind of EV marker. Thus, reportive evidential construction excludes a possibility that non-third-person is used as information source by definition, since first person and second person source are usually grounded in the context, which would yield a quotative reading. In contrast, quotative EV by which I mean in this paper is that the mode of access by which the speaker obtains information is quotation, which introduces the exact author of the quoted report (Aikhenvald 2004: 177), i.e. an explicit information source in constructions: after the speaker was told by a specific identifiable person, (s)he conveys the information to the addressee as (s)he has been told. In this vein, Reportive EV indicates reported information that may or may not be accurate, whereas a quotative indicates the information is accurate. Thus, if there is a syntactic constraint limiting first person source in -ay
constructions, it should target its quotative usage, not reportive one.

3. Properties of -Ay Constructions

3.1. Constructional Properties of -Ay Constructions

This section provides accounts of properties and behaviors of the reportive/quotative constructions. To begin with, let us look into its constructional properties by exploring examples of the construction:

(6=1) nayil pi-ka o-n-ta
    tomorrow rain-Nom come-Imperf-Decl
    'It rains tomorrow.'

(7) a. nayil pi-ka o-n-ta-(ko)-h-a-n-ta
    tomorrow rain-Nom come-Imperf-Decl-(Comp)-say-Imperf-Decl
    '(I heard that someone is saying that) It rains tomorrow.'

    b. nayil pi-ka o-n-t-ay-n-ta
    tomorrow rain-Nom come-Imperf-Decl-ay-Imperf-Decl
    '(It is said that) It rains tomorrow.'

(6) is a simple depictive utterance, whereas (7) shows original construction of the reportive/quotative construction (7a) and its grammaticalized form (7b). (7b) makes an example of reportive construction, since it does not have an explicit information source grounded in the given context. Originally, the reportive EV is a periphrastic expression ta-(ko)-h-a 'Decl-complementizer-say.' Thus, literal translation of (7a) is something like 'It is said that it rains tomorrow.' The periphrastic expression is contracted and underwent phonological attrition process (tako-ha-e [takohæ] > ta-ha-e [tahæ] > tay [tæ]). The attrition process takes place in other types of utterances as well such as -cay (hortative), -lay (imperative), and -nyay (interrogative) (For details, see J.-Y. Chung In preparation).

3.2. Semantic Properties of -Ay Constructions

The indirectness of the mode of access can be seen in most tokens of
utterances that contain -ay (KORTERM corpus; http://morph.kaist.ac.kr/kcp/). In fact, -ay constructions are used in multiple contexts. The following are the major categories of the functional distributions of the marker. First of all, the marker is employed in reportive EV contexts, as we already mentioned above:

(8) nongang-i kyengchal-uy supkyek-ul pat-ass-t-ay
farm-Nom police-Gen assault-Acc receive-Ant-Decl-ay
'(It is said that) the farm is under the police's attack.'

(9) ppalkan msukhu-ka tto yecalul cwuk-i-ess-t-ay
red mask-Nom again woman-Acc kill-Caus-Ant-Decl-ay
'(It is said that) the 'red mask' killed another woman.'

In (8), the speaker spreads information of the focal event that the farm was assaulted by the police to others, but the source is not explicitly indicated. Since there is no explicit source of information, there is no one who is responsible for the validity of the mentioned information. Thus, (8) could imply that since the information is not from the speaker's own observation, the speaker is not sure about the factivity of the focal event, but the speaker wants to spread the information anyway. In (9), in the same vein, information about the focal event that the red mask killed another woman is obtained from an unknown source. Hence, the speaker is simply conveying the obtained information, without any responsibility of the conveyed information, to the addressee. Since both of the examples have unknown source of information, thus, these are examples of reportive EV constructions.

Second, -ay constructions can be employed in quotative constructions. Quotative constructions are different from reportives in that they have a source of information that is explicitly spoken on the surface. Thus, depending on how reliable the explicit source is, the speaker can encode or implicate a certain degree of validity of the information. Examples can be shown as follows:

(10) wuli wangcho-ka kaeynch-anh-unyen sa-keyss-t-ay
our boss-Nom be.okay-if buy-will-Decl-ay
'Our boss told me that he will buy (it) if (it is) okay.'

(11)  
\begin{align*} 
\text{kimpwucang-nim-i} & \quad \text{kyelhon-ha-ci} & \quad \text{mal-ay} \\
\text{chief.Kim-Nom} & \quad \text{marry-do-Conn} & \quad \text{do.not-Imperative-ay} \\
\end{align*} 

'Chief Kim told me not to marry.'

In (10) and (11), source of the information is explicitly spoken as a grammatical subject in the utterances, i.e., our boss and chief Kim in (10) and (11), respectively. (11) is an imperative utterance that contains -lay and it implies that the speaker has had a conversation with chief Kim.

Notice that the -ay construction in Korean covers both semantics of reportive and quotative, which often require different linguistic expressions in more than a few languages (Aikhenvald 2004). By this reason, when -ay construction has a candidate for information source or for a protagonist of the focal event in question, the construction becomes ambiguous between reportive and quotative reading:

(12)  
\begin{align*} 
\text{Chelswu-ka} & \quad \text{yenghuy-lul} & \quad \text{coha-n-t-ay} \\
\text{Chelswu-Nom} & \quad \text{Yenghuy-Acc} & \quad \text{like-Imperf-Decl-ay} \\
\end{align*} 

a. (It is said that) Chelswu likes Yenghuy.

b. (I was told by Chelswu that) Chelswu likes Yenghuy.

As shown above, (12) has two interpretations: The information source can either be someone unspecified (reportive) or Chelswu (quotative). So to speak, information conveyed by (12a) may or may not be accurate, and the speaker does not fully vouch for veracity of the conveyed information. In contrast, (12b) indicates that the conveyed information is accurate, as far as the speaker can tell, since (s)he directly quotes what the information source (Chelswu) has told him or her. The marker -ay in Korean covers both of the functions, quotative and reportive, which other languages could have had separate constructions for each of them (Comanche, Northern Embera, etc., Aikhenvald 2004; p.c. Lev Michael).

3.3. Problem Raised: Validity of the Syntactic Constraint

We have discussed that -ay construction covers reportive and quotative
functions. Its reportive function requires that the information source should be a third-person source by definition, since it has to have unidentified and ungrounded source of information in the context such as anonymous people etc. To have a first person subject or a second person subject as information source necessarily means that the information source is specific and grounded in the context (no speaker regards what (s)he himself or herself has said as a hearsay originated from some unidentified and ungrounded source). Thus, it does not need a separate syntactic constraint. If we ever need a constraint, we might need to address it when we discuss quotative usages of -ay constructions. Quotative evidentials are licensed in a context where the speaker directly quotes what (s)he heard from someone else in general:

(13) *emma-ka* *kuke* *nwulu-myen* *an-toy-n-t-ay*

    mom-Nom it press-if not-be.okay-Imperf-Decl-ay

    Lit. I was told by my mom that I will not be okay if I press it.

    'My mom told me not to press it.'

In (13), the information source is a third-person (i.e. the speaker's mom) and the speaker directly quotes what (s)he heard from his or her mother. When the grammatical subject is replaced with a first person one, then acceptability of the utterance is marginal:

(13') *nay-ka* *kuke* *nwulu-myen* *an-toy-n-t-ay*

    I-Nom it press-if not-be.okay-Imperf-Decl-ay

    Lit. I was told by myself that I will not be okay if I press it.

    'I told myself not to press it.'

(13') is not acceptable, since it is not easy to imagine a context where the speaker quotes what (s)he is telling himself or herself. In this vein, this semantic constraint of the quotative construction is realized as a syntactic constraint, and the syntactic constraint seems to work in the grammaticality judgment. According to J.-Y. Chung (In preparation: 25), it seems that we are able to capture the patterns: he generalizes that the source of the embedded utterance [the perceived event] must be someone other than the current speaker and addressee.
The syntactic constraint is, however, nullified in some contexts where so-called split self (Lakoff 1996) is possible, i.e., where the recounting self in the evidential construction and the acting self in the focal event structure can be separated by different temporal/spatial configurations:

(14) kkwum-sok-eyse nay-ka kuke nwulu-myen an-toy-n-t-ay
    dream-inside-Loc I-Nom it press-if not-be.okay-Imperf-Decl-ay
    Lit. I was told by myself in my dream that I will not be okay if I press it.
    'I was told by myself in my dream not to press it.'

(15) nay-ka kuke nwulu-myen an-toy-n-t-ay-ess-ci
    I-Nom it press-if not-be.okay-Imperf-Decl-ay-Ant-Comm
    Lit. I'm telling you that I had been told by myself that I would not be okay if I press it.
    'I told you not to press it' or 'don't you press it!'

Both of the utterances are licensed even though they have a first person information source: (14) is licensed because adverbial 'in my dream' demarcate conceptual boundary between the recounting self of the speaker and his or her acting self in his or her dream, which licenses the construction by which the speaker quotes himself or herself. (15) is also licensed because anterior marker -ess- and committal marker -ci, which convey past tense reading and the speaker's assertive stance based on his or her belief, respectively, demarcate temporal/epistemic boundaries among the speech act, the recounting event, and the focal event so that the speaker at the speech time conceptualizes himself or herself in his or her memory to be a quotable information source objectively.

In this respect, I argue that the phenomena cannot be given fully plausible accounts only with a syntactic constraint, but that we should take into consideration semantics of the reportive/quotative EV constructions that involves viewpoint shifts and the speaker's subjective experiences, as hinted in (14) and (15). It is a natural consequence, considering that EV constructions involve multiple events. That is, EV constructions in general denote that via a specific mode of access, the speaker has perceived evidence which will be source of information. As a result, the event of the
speaker's perception, the event that has been perceived by the speaker, and the event of recounting are encoded simultaneously by a single grammatical construction. Since each of the events has a participant, it is natural that there are some syntactic patterns mirroring interaction among the participants in each of the events, especially when all the participants are all identical, for example. The phenomena are thus, not merely a target of surface syntactic constraint, but a target of deep semantics of subjectivity concerning the speaker's viewpoint and its shift. As an alternative, I argue that the Mental Spaces framework (Fauconnier 1994, 1997) provides a way to effectively present the subjective semantics of the phenomena and that is the main goal of Section 4.

4. Reportive/Quotative Constructions in Mental Spaces Framework

In order to effectively track the speaker's viewpoint, this section employs the Mental Spaces Theory (Fauconnier 1994; 997) for representing and modeling interrelationship between the source of information and the grammatical subject, which are in some cases identical or in others, not.

4.1 Space Building vs. Presuppositional Space Accommodation

The Mental Spaces framework is an optimal tool to track where the speaker's viewpoint anchors to and to capture subtle subjective meanings that the viewpoint shift causes. The temporally/spatially/deictically different configurations are obtained by setting up separate mental spaces evoked by space builders. For instance, the space builder in (14) is adverbial kkwun-sok-eyse [dream-inside-Loc] 'in my dream.' Deictically distant conceptualization of an event is accommodated by means of a separate mental space. Particularly, I propose that evidentiality constructions involve a different kind of space building - accommodating presuppositional space, because what it accommodates is presupposed knowledge that the speaker has obtained the information earlier than the speech time.

To begin with, let us explore notions of space building and presuppositional space accommodation by modeling different ways of diagrammatically representing space building and Presuppositional Space Accommodation. The moment the evidential marker is used, the past event
of the speaker’s observation is immediately accommodated. Then, the addressee accesses the accommodated knowledge that the speaker has obtained the focal information via a certain mode of access. This way of creating a mental space is different from the way in which a mental space is normally evoked or built, because what the EV construction accommodates is presupposed information, whereas what is accommodated by a normal space builder is the information that is being created and updated on-line.

On the one hand, the normal way of evoking or building a mental space is represented as below:

(16) *In the picture, the woman with blue eyes has green eyes.*

Space Embedding
/evocation

\[ g \]
Have (blue eyes)

\[ g' \]
Have (green eyes)

Base

Daughter

*Figure 1* Representation of space evocation (16)

An explicit space builder *in the picture* in (16) plays a role of narrowing down the construer’s attention to the temporally and spatially limited ‘space,’ and evokes the picture space. It sets up a mental domain within which the ensuing constructions, i.e., *the woman with blue eyes* can be given appropriate interpretation and eventually the seemingly truth-conditionally contradictory sentence is licensed. Frame elements or events which are present in the evoked frame or mental space can be inherited or exploited from the common ground (base space) where interlocutors can access the focal information. This paper will follow Fauconnier’s treatment of this relationship as a subordinating link between spaces. In other words, if there is a dashed line between base space and daughter space, it means that with an explicit space builder (*in the picture*), the daughter space (picture space in
this case) is embedded and subordinated to the base in the lattice of discourse space (Fauconnier 1997: 43). In addition, the corresponding roles in both spaces can be linked with a solid line (identity link), which means their identities are the same.

On the other hand, accommodating a presuppositional space is a different kind of space set-up, since the information that is to be accommodated in a presuppositional space is floating around the common ground or base space as soon as the interlocutors believe that the focal information is presupposed. Since the presupposed knowledge belongs to the Base space, not to the daughter space that is branched off from the Base, this kind of space building differs from the usual way. As soon as the presupposed information is accommodated by a particular linguistic item which is contained in the interlocutor’s utterance, a “subjectivity experience” space emerges. As a result, another interlocutor, who does not yet share the presupposed information that is accommodated by the other’s utterance, seeks for the unassimilated information. Let us take an example to ponder on this issue:

(17) a. *pi-ka o-n-tako-ha-e*
   rain-Nom come-Imperf-complementizer-say-Decl

b. *pi-ka o-n-t-ay*
   rain-Nom come-Imperf-Decl-ay’
’They say that it is raining.’

As shown in (17), the original construction of -ay (17a) and -ay construction (17b) seem to convey similar meaning. However, when we attempt to negate the utterances, (17a) can have two different scopes of negation, whereas (17b) has only one choice, which is shown in (18) and (19) below:

(18) a. *pi-ka o-n-tako an-ha-e*
   rain-Nom come-Imperf-complementizer Neg-say-Decl
   ’They don’t say that it is raining.’

b. *pi-ka an-o-n-tako ha-e*
   rain-Nom Neg-come-Imperf-complementizer say-Decl
'They say that it isn’t raining.'

(19) *pi-ka an-on-t-ay*

\begin{verbatim}
    rain-Nom    Neg-come-Imperf-Decl-ay'
\end{verbatim}

'They say that it isn’t raining.'

Negation in sentences in (18), which are negative counterparts of (17a) can have its scope either over the embedded event (it is raining) or over the embedding event (they say). In contrast, (19), which is a negative counterpart of (17b), has only one option which has its negation scope over the embedded event (it is raining). This suggests that whenever we employ the reportive/quotative evidential marker, the fact that the speaker has obtained the information via indirect source is necessarily presupposed, which is proven by the negation test: the fact that the speaker’s recounting event is out of the scope of negation suggests that it is presupposed knowledge.

Putting it in terms of the Mental Spaces framework, (18b) has a different way of creating a mental space from that in (18a). In (18a), metarepresentational predicate (i.e., *say* here) plus complementizer construction is an explicit space builder, which clearly evokes a semantic domain where the speaker accesses the target information. In contrast, in (18b), the space where the speaker accesses the information is already presupposed in the common ground. The question of whether the speaker observed the event or not is infelicitous to talk about, since it is already presupposed by the speaker. In this respect, I argue that a way of evoking a mental space used in evidentiality constructions is different from a normal way of creating a mental space, which I term as presuppositional space accommodation, and I propose that it be represented as shown in <Figure 2> below.

A subjective experience space that is accommodated as a presupposed knowledge is projected from the speaker s’s mental space in the common ground (base space). So to speak, a role s in Base projects its subjective experience space, which is presupposed, where the speaker has obtained the focal information from information source (IS), x. The same identity link is used as in <Figure 1>. In this case, however, the speaker obtains the focal information indirectly from the information source x.
4.2 Modeling -Ay Constructions in the Mental Spaces Framework

In this sub-section, this paper aims to model -ay constructions within the Mental Spaces framework (Fauconnier 1994, 1997). To begin with, let us take a look at a declarative example that contains -ay in it:

(20) chelswu-ka ne-lul salangha-n-t-ay
Chelswu-Nom you-Acc love-Imperf-Decl-\textit{ay}
As briefly discussed above, (20) is ambiguous between quotative (a) and reportive (b) readings. In (20a), the source of the information and the grammatical subject are identical, i.e. Chelswu, whereas in the reportive reading (20b), the source is someone unspecified (X), which is different from the grammatical subject. The two readings can be represented within the Mental Spaces framework as follows:

In <Figure 3>, the quotative reading, the current communicative frame is represented by base space where the speaker (S) and the addressee (H) exist. The speaker's perception of the information is presupposed as we discussed in the previous sub-section, which is represented by Presuppositional Space Accommodation and which is accommodated by S's Subjective Experience space via its projection. Since the speaker makes an utterance based on his or her perception, i.e. hearing Chelswu's (C) speech, the speaker's Subjective Experience space contains the speaker (S) and Chelswu (C), where the speaker obtains the information from C. Notice that S, not S', is present in S's Subjective Experience space: since the space accommodates presupposed knowledge and the cognizer in the space belongs to the identical temporal/ spatial/ deictic domain to Base space, identities of speaker in Base and of cognizer in the Subjective Experience
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space are the same. Lastly, in C's speech space, Chelswu (C') loves the current addressee, which is represented by a space that contains the addressee (H'), Chelswu (C'), and semantic frame love where C' loves the addressee. Since S cannot directly access to the information of C's loving H', but access to it via his or her Subjective Experience (i.e. indirectly obtaining the focal information), it conveys a reading of indirect evidentiality. With this representation, we can denote that the source (C in S's perception space) and the grammatical subject (C' in C's speech space) are identical by means of the identity link.

Now, let us take a look at the other reading as shown in <Figure 4>:

![Figure 4](image)

<Figure 4> Representation of reportive construction in (20b)

In (20b), reportive reading, the unidentified source (anonymous people, hearsay, rumor, etc.; X in S's subjective experience space) and the grammatical subject (C in X's speech space) are not linked by the identity line. In hearsay mental space, unspecified source X' can access the information that C loves the addressee in the hearsay space (via any mode of access (MOA)). By showing this contrast in the representation, we can motivate the different readings that give rise to semantic ambiguity of (20). Comparing reportive interpretation to quotative one, reportive constructions convey less accuracy and less responsibility of the speaker towards the information. This is captured by the fact that as shown in <Figure 4>, S cannot directly access to the focal information and that the information source itself is unidentified and ungrounded labeled as X. The speaker's
indirect access to the unidentified information source in reportive constructions gives rise to stronger interpretation of the lack of responsibility than the speaker’s indirect access to the explicit information source in quotative constructions.

This model easily captures the fact that reportive/quotative construction is not acceptable when the information source and the recounting self are identical, i.e. when the surface subject is a first person, the quotative reading is not licensed. This is shown below:

(21) nay-ka ne-lul salangha-n-t-ay
   I-Nom you-Acc love-Imperf-Decl-ay

   a. *(I was told by myself) I love you.
   b. (It is said that) I love you.

As mentioned, reading (21a) is not licensed, whereas (21b) is acceptable. The normal conscious speaker would not say (21) as a quotative sense, since there is no reason for the speaker to quote himself or herself. The speaker’s perception space involves semantic frame observation. The frame has its frame elements such as an observer, an entity that is observed, an instrument, etc. If an observer and an entity that is observed are identical, the construction absolutely involves the speaker’s subjective experience. In this vein, it would normally be unnatural if the speaker regards himself or herself an observable object. The inseparability of the speaker and himself or herself results in the ungrammaticality of (21a).
As shown in <Figure 5>, S in base space cannot be split into S and S' in the speaker's Subjective Experience space, because S in the space, whose viewpoint is inherited from Base space, belongs to the same mental space as S' does. It indicates that one cannot observe himself or herself from a third person viewpoint. Furthermore, if S in Base space could access both S and S' in the Subjective Experience space, it would model direct mode of access because S in Base and S' in the subjective space are directly linked. This move is intuitive, because in the real world, self cannot be split, i.e. one cannot observe himself/herself doing an action objectively. The unacceptability of (21a) is represented by S and S' in S's Subjective Experience space which are linked to one S in the Base space in <Figure 5>. In contrast, (21b) has no problem, since there is no self-split in the speaker's Subjective Experience, but the speaker simply obtains the information from what unidentified source X says.

4.3. Semantics Overrides a Syntactic Constraint

My main claim is that only with the surface constraints, we are not able to fully account for -ay constructions Rather, we need to look into its deep semantics of subjectivity due to the interaction between the experiencing origo and the grammatical subject and shifts of the viewpoint. This sub-section backs up the claim by showing that within the Mental Spaces framework, the examples that are not accounted for by the syntactic constraint are resolved. That is because the framework makes an effective tool to grasp the interaction
among the experiencing origo, the source of information, the surface subject, temporal domains of each of the encoded events, etc.

In quotative utterance (22), although it has a first person subject as its grammatical subject and information source, the utterance that contains -ay is licensed. In other words, even though the speaker quotes himself or herself, (22) is licensed. This is unexpected, considering Chung’s generalization that the source of information should be a third person:

(22) nay-ka ne-lul salangha-n-t-ay-ess-e
    I-Nom you-Acc love-Imperf-Decl -ay-Ant-Informal.Indic
    Lit. (I was told by myself that) I love you.
    ‘I said that I love you.’

It is noted, however, that (22) contains another linguistic device at the end: an anterior marker that marks a past tense or a perfective aspect.

In (22), past space is evoked by the anterior marker, which in turn accommodates a presupposed space for the speaker’s subjective experience (SE, henceforth) in the past. Notice that S’ in Past space and S’’ in SE space are not connected: since the current speaker’s viewpoint from S in Base space can access S’ in SE space via the past space (S’), S’ in SE space inherits the current viewpoint from S in Base space. However, S’’ cannot inherit the viewpoint from S in Base, because S’’ or S’’’s hearsay is conceptualized as an external source so that conceptual distance is created between S’ and S’’. This distancing effect conforms to what Slobin and Aksu (1982:198)

\[ S'' \quad S's \ Subjective \ Experience \]
\[ S' \]
\[ S' \]
\[ S'' \quad (LOVE \ H') \]
\[ H \]
\[ Base \]
\[ S' \]
\[ H' \]
\[ S's \ speech \]
\[ Past \]

<Figure 6> Representation of (22)
observed in 1980's, which states that “[h]earsay evidentials often indicate that the speaker feels distanced from the situation he is describing.” Conceptual distance is created not between the speaker and the event, but between the speaker and his/her own discourse. Since \(-ay\) is assumed to inherit the distancing property of indirect evidentials, this motivates diagram (22), where the current viewpoint anchors to \(S'\), who is an experiencing origo who obtains the information. The temporal distance from the speech time which is explicitly spoken on the surface (by anterior marker \(-ess\)) facilitates the speaker to regard himself/herself as an observable object, although the person acquiring evidence and the person expressing it are identical. In this vein, the unacceptability that arises when only \(-ay\) is employed in an utterance that contains a first person subject (cf. (22)) is neutralized.

The farther distance can be encoded by adding another layer of mental space. In (23), by adding the speaker’s belief space that is evoked by committal marker \(-ci\) at the end, the farther distance is explicitly spoken out and thus, it clearly licenses a conjunct utterance in spite of the usage of quotative EV:

\[
\text{(23) } \text{nay-ka } \text{ne-lul } \text{salangha-n-t-ay-ess-ci} \\
\text{I-Nom you-Acc love-Imperf-Decl-ay-Ant-Committal} \\
\text{Lit. (I am telling you that I was told by myself that) I love you.} \\
\text{‘I TOLD you that I love you!’}
\]

![Figure 7](representation)
(23) conveys a strong epistemic modal interpretation with the speaker's certainty and assertiveness. (23) is licensed in a context where the speaker reemphasizes the fact that (s)he has told the addressee that (s)he loves the addressee. As shown in (23), committal marker -ci- inserts another space between Base and Past spaces, which forms another layer via which the speaker can access her own discourse. So to speak, by having two layers evoked by the anterior marker and the committal marker, the conceptual distance between the speaker and his or her own discourse is farther (S in Base S' in epistemic belief S'' in Past space S'' in SE space) and thus, the quotative EV with a first person source is licensed. This has also been observed in the previous literature: J.-Y. Chung stipulates that “the source of the embedded utterance must be someone other than the current speaker and addressee... or the embedded utterance must be one which is assumed to have been uttered” (In preparation: 13, 25; my emphasis). In this framework, there is no need of stipulation, because the viewpoint shift and its distancing effect take care of it.

There is another case where the semantics of -ay constructions overrides the syntactic constraint: when an adverbial clause is employed which demarcates between a conscious self and an unconscious subject and thus, which accommodates the self-split. For instance, when in my dream is used in an utterance that contains the EV construction and a first person pronoun, then the violation of the syntactic constraint will also be neutralized as shown in (24):

(24) nay kkwum-sok-eyse nay-ka ne-lul salangha-n-t-ay

my dream-inside-Loc I-Nom you-Acc love-Imperf-Decl-ay

Lit. In my dream, I was saying that I love you.

'In my dream, I was told by myself that I love you.'
In (24), the source is the speaker himself or herself. If it had been an utterance depicting the real world, it would have been ruled out, since in the real world, the speaker cannot make his or her 'self' as an observable entity. In the speaker's dream space, however, nothing is impossible: the person who acquires the evidence and the person who expresses it can all be the speaker even at the same time. When the speaker's dream space is evoked, the syntactic constraint gets loose and hence, it sounds like the speaker heard his or her own speech that (s)he loves the addressee and reported it to the addressee, which is represented in terms of the Mental Spaces framework in <Figure 8>.

In the figure, the adverbial builds up a meta space that contains the speaker's subjective experience space in it, because what the utterance means is all about the speaker's dream. In the dream space, S in Base and S/ S' in S's SE space are freely linked simultaneously, because in the dream, the experiencing origo can play multiple roles of an information obtainer and an information source.

The *dream* adverbial, however, should be the speaker's own one so that the speaker can freely access inside the space, when *-ay* constructions are used as quotative evidential constructions that have a first person information source. For example, if adverbial *in his dream* is used, the utterances will not make a good sense:

(25) ?ku-uy kkwum-sok-eyse nay-ka ne-lul
his dream-inside-Loc I-Nom you-Acc

salangha-n-t-ay
love-Imperf-Decl-ay

Lit. In his dream, I was told by myself that I love you.

'In his dream, I was told by myself that I was saying that I love you.'

Normally, one cannot access another's dream, unless he or she can read people's mind. The inaccessibility is represented by the prohibited link between S in Base and S' in S's Subjective Experience space. By this obvious reason, quotative construction (25) is not licensed. There is, however, a way to obviate the blocked access of the speaker: reduplicating the EV form.

In (26), since two EV markers are employed, there should be two indirect sources. One of them is the first person source as we have already assumed.
and the other is 'him.' As shown in <Figure 10> below, the successive dissemination of the information is represented by multiple layers, which are set up by reduplication of the EV marker. Comparing it to <Figure 9>, the crucial difference is that in <Figure 10>, the speaker is able to access the information only in Base space via 'him,' since the dream world cannot be directly accessed by the speaker. (25) is not licensed, since the speaker attempts to directly penetrate 'his' dream space as shown in <Figure 9>.

<Figure 10> Representation of (26)

Thanks to its successive dissemination of the information, the reduplicated -ay form is used when we express third-hand information as exemplified in (27):

(27) Chelswu-ka Yenghuy-lul cohaha-n-t-ay-ess-t-ay
     Chelswu-Nom Yenghuy-Acc like-Imperf-Decl-ay-Ant-Decl-ay
     'I was told by X, who had also been told by Y, that Chelswu likes Yenghuy.'

In reportive construction in (27), the reduplicated -ay construction depicts a situation where the focal information (Chelswu likes Yenghuy) is handed down from Y, who had actually heard Chelswu, to X, and then to the speaker. The third-hand reportive evidential is also covered by the reduplicated -ay construction.
In sum, the seemingly plausible syntactic constraint covers only a portion of the semantics of the constructions. In order to fully grasp the construction, we need to consider its deep viewpoint semantics of subjectivity involved in the constructions, specifically the speaker's mental accessibility and the origo's distancing strategy depending on which semantic domain the speaker anchors his or her viewpoints to.

5. Conclusion

This paper has discussed the distribution of Korean reportive/quotative EV marker -ay, exploring its constructional and functional properties. I claimed that -ay constructions cover reportive or quotative usages, explicating different functions and semantic implications of the two usages. Basically, I argued that if there exists a syntactic generalization for the construction, which states that the information source should be a third-person one, it should be for its quotative constructional usages, not reportive ones. This paper further showed that the syntactic generalization even does not hold when we look into examples where the recounting self in the evidential construction and the acting self in the focal event structure can be separated by different temporal/spatial configurations. Hence, I argued that the phenomena are not a matter of a mere syntactic constraint, but a matter of deep semantics of subjectivity which requires consideration of viewpoint semantics. In this vein, within the Mental Spaces framework as an alternative, I provided a unified account of the phenomena tracking the subtle semantics of subjectivity due to the viewpoint shift.

This paper argued that only with syntactic constraints, -ay constructions cannot be properly treated. The reasoning is as follows: Since the origo is not usually explicitly expressed in the syntax of the construction, only one subject is expressed on the surface and hence, a purely syntactic treatment of -ay constructions requires a lot of abstract syntax. Utterances that employ an evidential marker indicate that there are two events processed, the one in which the speaker experienced the information, and the one where the speech takes place. The two conceptually discrete processes are amalgamated into an utterance. In this respect, the only clue for us to understand the implicit syntax is semantics of the constructions, i.e. semantics of the experiencing origo's subjective experience that is affected
by temporal, spatial, and intentional settings for the processed events. In order to support the claim, this paper has shown that employing an explicit space building adverbial (e.g., in my dream etc), anterior marker -ess, or committal marker -s evokes a separate mental space that splits the recounting ego and the grammatical subject, and thus, obviates the surface syntactic constraint.

The discussion that have been made in this paper have theoretical implications. First, EV constructions are based on semantics of subjectivity, because the constructions, especially reportive constructions involve implicit reference to the speaker, the addressee, and the given speech context (Langacker 1990). The factors that affect degree of subjectivity include first/non-first pronominal reference and explicit/ implicit marking of the source. Second, the framework of Mental Spaces Theory makes an effective tool to represent semantics of EV constructions, i.e., to represent multiple events that are implicitly involved in EV constructions. Especially, I proposed that EV constructions involve *Presuppositional Space Accommodation*, which is to represent how presupposed knowledge - the fact that the speaker has obtained the information - is accommodated. In addition, it transparently showed the interaction among implicit/explicit participants of the constructions such as a participant of the focal event (grammatical subject), a participant of the event perception (an experiencing origo), and participants of recounting the event (the speaker and the source).

I believe that the proposed way of creating a mental space of subjective knowledge - Presuppositional Space Accommodation - will lessen gigantic functional loads that Mental Space literature naively assumes Base space to carry. This study suggests that there are various kinds of unspecified knowledge in Base space that only the origo can access and presupposed knowledge is one of them. Once it is grounded, it should be specified and regarded as having its independent mental space of Base space. I believe that the mechanism is necessary in construing evidentiality marked constructions via a certain morpheme, since it necessarily involves the experiencing origo's access to presupposed knowledge of subjectivity (the conveyed information has been obtained prior to the speech act).
References


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